The notion of ‘human security’ as a shared responsibility in the existing security partnerships of the Mediterranean.

An Analysis of NATO, the European Union and OSCE.

1. Introduction

Since the Arab Uprisings in 2011, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has become increasingly insecure. Coupled with state fragility or even complete collapse as in, for example, Libya, Syria and Yemen, increasing have also been additional threats and challenges – large scale migration and radicalization. High unemployment, especially amongst the young, coupled with environmental threats due to climate change, have further complicated the security situation on the ground. Meanwhile, in the policy discourse, security is often viewed as the absence of violence where development is primarily material. However, as the recent world developments, in this case in the MENA region, indicate, this categorization is no longer fully applicable. Absence of violence no longer implies that the situation can be described as secure and this insecurity can easily transcend itself into violence later on. In the MENA region many partnerships exist with the aims to tackle insecurity, however, through the overview of them it becomes clear that the partnerships are primarily focused on fixing the symptoms rather than problem’s root causes. Wider academic debates have called for the need to “developmentalize” security, alongside the “securitization” of development. This debate has primarily come about due to the criticism that “hard security” has sidelined the human while the “soft” development language does not address enough of “hard security”.1 Sideline as such has been the concept of human security, which in essence, can be summarized as “the freedom from fear and freedom from want”. This paper aims to review, analyze and evaluate three main security partnerships of the Mediterranean, those being NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, European Union Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and OSCE’s Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. In this review a particular attention will be dedicated to viewing the use of the concept of “human security” as a notion of shared responsibility. Responsibility here is meant as per Weyland (2017), as when “the state authorities and the international community

share the obligation to guarantee security for the civilian population”. In some senses this notion of “shared responsibility” already exists and is used by actors within primarily development-oriented discourse, as an understanding of a shared responsibility to help. However, it is a concept that is largely absent from security discussions, especially if considering further adding of the “human” to the center of this debate. Meanwhile, the human dimension is very much at the heart of the challenges and insecurity facing MENA today, prompting this review to further focus on issues like youth and governance. Overall these areas will serve as the building blocks that connect other security challenges like terrorism, radicalization, migration, food and environmental insecurities, without any additional focus on them due to the time constraints. This review is not intended to provide and overarching outlook of each area of insecurity nor each partnership discourse or projects in the field. The given examples are rather used for illustrative emphasis in an overall discussion, which aims to answer the question on how (if) the current security partnerships of the Mediterranean approach the question of ‘human security’ and whether we can examine an approach that intends to share the responsibility in doing so.

1.1 Methodology

To conduct this research, primary documents from the three partnerships are used and elaborated upon in a wider debate building upon secondary research literature. Primarily used are published reports, reviews of the missions and speeches from senior leaders. The paper has its limitations, primarily given the time constraint and the research conducted in it not all initiatives or projects from the three partnerships have been fully viewed. The paper also only considered projects ongoing at the moment or ones started recently. Additionally, the research work encountered difficulties in navigating the often confusing systems of initiatives and projects. It can be argued that this problem encountered in the research process highlights one of the main practical challenges. In facing difficulties to understand how certain practical projects fit within a larger strategic long-term goal, it can be often concluded that they do not. Therefore, the research process was first to highlight one of the continuous challenges exhibited in this work.

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1.2 Structure

The paper will be presented as follows: first, I will shortly discuss the concept of “human security” and provide a very broad literature review of the main debates around the concept; second, the three main existing partnerships considered in this paper will be introduced and considered in terms of the “human security” concept. The aim is to review and analyze whether with or without the use of the term “human security”, the partnerships have goals aimed at supporting the implications of the term. Third, the paper will turn to evaluate these partnerships and their approach towards human security by looking at the pressing MENA issues – such as youth and governance – given that these areas are the main focus of the Larnaca workshop. Finally, before concluding, I will connect the provided overview by analyzing these partnerships in a wider theoretical framework of human security and further explore the question of human security and its relationship with national security.

1.3 Human Security

As a concept, human security can first be traced to the United Nations Human Development Report published in 1994. The document concluded that for a long time prior, the concept of security has been primarily shaped through the idea of conflicts between states. Meanwhile, many people around the world see insecurity in their daily lives not as armed territorial conflicts but in the sense of job, income and environmental insecurity. Directly connected to international development, the UNDP report aimed to guide the thinking to consider that development is much more practically significant when addressing insecurity in a long-term perspective. As per the main definition, human security is ought to be seen as a “condition of safety from seven categories of threats, divided into: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security” (UNDP, 1994: 24-25). In policy implications this definition intends to signify that governments’ legitimacy rests on their ability to extend capacity and willingly guarantee the safety, basic needs and essential freedoms of citizens and communities. However, as argued by Krause (2007) in itself this definition has led to the failure of the concept’s policy application. While, the concept has been used in the policy circles, its wide definition, which has included

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human needs in economic, food, social and environmental senses, has tempered its applicability. As argued by Krause, “human security seems to capture almost everything that could be considered a threat to wellbeing” and as such it loses its very meaning. Here, this proposition returns to the old theoretical and legal debate between scholars of human rights, considering the tensions between civil and political rights (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and economic and social rights (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). In the legal sense, foremost the difference exists in state’s obligations and their wordings (exhibited in Article 2). While the civil and political rights are seen as ones that the state “needs to respect and ensure for all individuals within its territory”, the economic, social and cultural rights are urged by the states to “undertake steps to the maximum of its recourses”. Therefore, while Kaldor (2011) has regarded that human security is the coming together of peace and human rights even human rights as legal concepts have encountered political pushbacks when discussing rights such as access to health care, clean air, developed environment etc. This pushback is in some respects related to the idea that civil and political rights, infused in liberal individualism, are negative rights, meaning that they do not require expenditures or resources. While, in some ways this thinking can be seen as outdated, given that ensuring proper civil and political rights often require spending (such as ensuring free and fair elections), it can be easily argued that they require less financial commitment than ensuring free access to education or health care. This conclusion is especially pertinent to countries with limited resources, including in MENA, where growing population and declining economy has put additional strains on any welfare functions. Therefore, this debate of human rights brings further attention to the question of human security and not only from individual nation-side but also to the way that insecurity in MENA region is approach and addressed from the outside.

As proposed by Liotta & Owen (2006) and Krause (2007), when looking at human security within the wider security partnership approach, it would be better to focus on the question of “freedom from fear”, meaning the freedom from physical threats and violence in people’s daily lives as a starting point. A report written by authors at the London School of Economics (LSE) and presented to the European Union’s High Representative Federica Mogherini (2016), argues that it would first, be an approach tended towards the rule of law, politics and policing rather than one guarded by mere diplomacy and economic/military coercion, which is prevalent now.

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3 UN ICCPR and ICESCR Article 2
Such approach to human security would also eliminate the present weakness implied by the incapacity to clearly answer the question on whose responsibility it is to provide individuals with human security. While human rights are afforded to the citizens by their states who are technically held accountable to each other on an international stage, human security as a concept fails to provide such dedication. Instead, the state itself is often seen as a problem. Meanwhile, in mirroring philosopher Hannah Arendt, the state itself should primarily be seen as a security provider – as state’s legitimacy and stability are main resources in protecting the citizens from threats and insecurity. Here, therefore it becomes significant to consider the question of governance in the Middle East and North Africa – a clear goal that can have policy implications for furthering the advancing of broader human security as opposed to mere national security. A stable state, goal for which regional and state governance efforts are important, according to research done by Siegle (2011), is also most likely to support and respect human rights. Therefore, this also touches upon what has been often regarded as second and third generation human rights – the individual and collective rights to education, health care and environment – or as better known in the human security concept as the “freedom from want”.

2. Existing Partnerships

2.1. NATO Mediterranean Dialogue

The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was launched in 1994 as a way to engage non-NATO member states from the southern Mediterranean with the Alliance’s goals. It stems from the Alliance’s view “that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability of the Mediterranean”, a view closely mirroring those of the other two partnerships that will be examined in this paper. Brought upon the Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, which permits political consultation outside alliance membership, the countries currently involved in the Dialogue are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. Alongside the Mediterranean Dialogue at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, what is known as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative began, therefore enhancing the partnership with the Middle East. The Initiative includes countries from the Gulf Cooperation Council – Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and

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UAE.9 However, due to the country selection and this paper particularly focusing on the Mediterranean this Initiative will not be discussed in further detail.

The Mediterranean Dialogue’s mission has widely focused on fostering political dialogue in security arena through primarily bilateral structure (NATO +1), although multilateral meetings (NATO+7) are being organized as well. As a recent report by the German Marshall Fund indicates, multilateral channels of communication have been increasingly fostered in the recent years. It even regards that the MD remains as one of the only setting in which Israel and the Arab states still maintain regional discussions in a fruitful manner.10 This element, therefore, provides a significant consideration while aiming to approach the challenges of the Mediterranean states. However, it has also drawn some criticism, as argued by El-Houdaigui (2016), the MD can be best seen as security outsourcing where NATO contributes their expertise, in line with NATO security and strategic objectives, to the Mediterranean countries who are then invited to implement them.11 The primarily, in its nature, bilateral cooperative structure therefore in essence at best strengthens the security confidence on the North-South axis, while this same nature of partnerships endanger the multilateral security amongst the Southern partners themselves or amongst them and NATO in a multilateral framework.12 Furthermore, the activities and engagement of the MD has been primarily dedicated towards military activities, with some activities dedicated to civil emergency planning, public diplomacy and crisis management. For example, practically under the Individual and Partnership Cooperation program, assistance extends to such areas as “security institution building, defense transformation, modernization and capacity development, civil-military relations and defense-related aspects”.13 As will be evaluated in the next section, along with its dialogue function, the MD partners are engaged in a number of practical projects, significantly grown in numbers over the last decades, primarily at the request of the partner states.14

partner states have signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) agreement giving them access to the Partnership Cooperation Menu with over 30 agreed areas of cooperation. The primarily downside to these projects are their bilateral nature, as such focus on individual partner states rather than the region or sub-regions in specific.\(^\text{15}\)

However, while the MD also serves as a dialogue for diplomacy, what is missing at a greater strength is the political dimension, which would allow to connect some of these practical ideas to political cooperation in addressing them primarily to a community and human security level. While at the Wales Summit (2014), Secretary General Rasmussen acknowledged that the threats experienced from East to South are “on a scale we have not seen for over two decades”\(^\text{16}\), emphasizing the particularly diverse nature of the security threats, NATO has not shown thorough engagement with them.\(^\text{17}\)

Although the Alliance has not focused on human security under this term in itself, it is not doubtful that some aims in addressing the insecurity of the communities and individuals have been pursued. Particularly the Partnership for Peace program (PfP), established in 1994, has aided towards addressing human insecurity. The program focuses on three important features – democratic control of the armed forces; defense budget transparency and interoperability which allows NATO and partners to join their efforts to address crisis and to offer peace support.\(^\text{18}\) The PfP program has previously also been used with aims such as providing help to the Afghani government in establishing a secure environment. Therefore, it shows a precedent in addressing human security, such as providing safe environment to the communities, one that could be used for the case of Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries as well.

2.2. European Union

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a policy initiative dates back to the Barcelona Process in 1995 when it was reached between the European Union’s member states and 10 Southern


\(^{18}\) De Santis, Nicola. “NATO’s Outreach to and Cooperation with Mediterranean Countries through the Mediterranean Dialogue”, *IEMED Panorama*, (2010): 140.
Mediterranean states, those being Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. While Syria has self-suspended in 2011, Mauritania has since joined the number of states. Additionally since the inception it has been reformulated into the wider European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), enacted in 2002, and also seen the founding of the Union for the Mediterranean with the aim of reinforcing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The ENP, which is the main financial funding vehicle for the Mediterranean\textsuperscript{19}, through its various linkages to the partner states has focused on three levels of cooperation – political, economic and social, human & cultural one.\textsuperscript{20} The EMP and ENP can use two types of instruments towards the Mediterranean states, those being negotiated agreements (with binding trading rules) and economic support programs which allows to allocate funds to projects in the partner states.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, similarly to other programs by the EU, the EMP has also largely focused on economic liberalization as a direct link to achieving security.\textsuperscript{22} While looking at the projects undertaken between the EU and their Mediterranean partner states, I will also mention examples by the Union of the Mediterranean whose General Secretariat is majority (55%) funded by the European Union.\textsuperscript{23}

However, one tends to notice that widely within the academic literature on the European Union’s goals towards the region, the perception of failure has been advanced. The economic and social goals with the aim of “creating an area of shared prosperity” have not reached their aims, with one particular example being the democratic political reform as a core goal since 1995.\textsuperscript{24} Such goals have been further reiterated since the Arab Uprisings when the approach themed “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” was set up.\textsuperscript{25} As part of it, the aims to achieve democratization and social reforms have been conditioned on the old European Union’s motto as “more for more”, which intends to provide additional concessions from the EU in return for social reforms.

\textsuperscript{23} EU statement on shaping the concept of a Mediterranean of the future speech
Uprisings have, however, seen worsening of economic conditions on the ground, which has led the suggestions that the motto can rather be called “less of the same” with less funds disbursed, and very little social concessions made. Meanwhile the same liberalization projects that benefited the elites in countries like Morocco or Egypt are continuing.\(^{26}\)

Significantly it is the UfM, which was created with “an action-driven methodology”, that indicates their governance being based “on the principles of co-ownership of decisions and \textit{shared responsibility} between the two shores of the Mediterranean”\(^{27}\) (emphasis added). The UfM is one of the largest bodies within the security partnerships considered, directly targeting areas of interest in discussion of human security as an interaction between development and security. 28 out of the 32 of currently “under implementation” projects have been focused on regional human development in the areas, such as, youth, unemployment, women empowerment, mobility and higher education.\(^{28}\) In dealing with the security of its neighborhoods, the EU’s released 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy prioritized stabilization, differentiation and mutual ownership as the key priorities. The aimed proposal sees the building of state and society resilience together by focusing on socioeconomic development, conflict mitigation and administrative assistance.\(^{29}\) Significantly the UfM, which would fall under this policy plan, is the one without a clear security mandate while arguably it has had one of the most straightforward positive effects for human security.\(^{30}\) Overall, it has generally prioritized a liberal view where along with the hard security paradigm we can also notice discussions of individuals – the “human security” – freedoms, human developments, democracy and human rights.

Time and time again it has been emphasized by senior figures at the European Union that cooperation is the key. Most recently at the Climate, Security and Peace event in June hosted by Federica Mogherini, it was agreed that climate risks are a “shared responsibility to prepare” and should be addressed commonly as causes and symptoms on climate, security and


However, looking aside of the UfM, which only constitutes a small part of the broader EU’s security approach towards the Mediterranean, the other projects have been focused on the status quo security-stability nexus, with the state at the center, therefore, minimizing any long-term achievements.\(^ {32}\)

2.3. OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-Operation

The OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation is seen as existing since the creation of the OSCE itself in the 1975 Helsinki Act. However, it is ought to have acquired the cooperation’s current name in 1993 Rome Ministerial Council. Then, countries Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia requested a stronger relationship, with Jordan joining in 1998.\(^ {33}\) Additionally Libya and Palestinian Authority have expressed interest in joining, while such intentions have not been fully supported, they have been able to participate in some of the partnership activities such as the seminars.\(^ {34}\) The most recent areas of interest towards the MENA region were expressed in the Declaration on the Co-operation with the Mediterranean Partners that was adopted at the 2014 Basel Ministerial Council meeting, as “terrorism, illicit traffic in narcotics, organized crime, money-laundering, trafficking in human beings, illegal migration, gender equality, energy security, environment and security”.\(^ {35}\)

The OSCE’s mandate goes back to the Helsinki Final Act, passed in 1975, which at the initiative of the Southern states included the acceptance of European security being closely linked to that of the Mediterranean as an area in whole. Alongside its mandate, the OSCE, which primarily acts as a forum, has a conditional directive in how OSCE involvement can be activated. As the involvement has to be voluntary and driven by demand the rules of any engagement from the organization are clear.\(^ {36}\) First, it can only happen at a clear request of the state; second, the participating states must reach a consensus in any activity that is outside of

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35 [https://www.osce.org/cio/130561](https://www.osce.org/cio/130561)

the OSCE territory; third, resources must be found for any extra-budgetary resources.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, particularly the Med dialogue has been receiving miniscule funding as the partners do not pay into the annual budget (uncertain if given the economic situations in the states it would be possible) and some of the participating states are reluctant to provide extra funding given the other focus areas of the organization taking lead. Furthermore, for funding to be raised for the partner states, the partner states themselves must request this funding for sustainable projects.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, it can be visible that the method of partnership in itself is not only limited beyond the dialogue function, but is also heavily state-focused and state-led.

This OSCE security partnership is particularly considerable in this paper, due to its perspective which comes from the organizations engagement with areas such as “human dimension commitments”, establishment of a “security model for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century” and in considering “a comprehensive approach to security”.\textsuperscript{39} It indicates that one could perceive it as a security partnership with a further focus on the “human”. Furthermore, alongside the Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO, the OSCE also has the advantage of a broad membership, which in this case also includes Russia, as an addition to the NATO countries like USA, Canada and Turkey. Due to its mandate, it has the ability to broaden the dialogue by including regional organizations, for example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States or the African Union, which can be especially beneficial in establishing a multilateral dialogue, including in opening up the OSCE dialogue for states that are not partner states in the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation program. Involvement also occurs with academia, NGOs and civil society, and is praised in their documents such as the 2014 Basel Declaration.\textsuperscript{40} These positive aspects could and should be used further to establish a practical cooperation in the area of \textit{shared} responsibility, which upon more careful examination in the next section, is not yet the case.

\textsuperscript{40} https://www.osce.org/cio/130561
3. Evaluating the Partnerships

The evaluation of the security partnerships – their mandate and aims – together with the practical project initiatives, show that they are primarily bilateral projects where large sums are spent through the partnerships with very little added effect in addressing the wider human security challenges. Often, these projects aim to address regional insecurity which has emerged as a response while the underlying problems are left untouched. This section of the paper uses further practical case examples from each of the partnerships to illustrate if human security as a concept is used and implied within each of the partnership programs. Therefore, this section is used to examine and provide the results of the examined programs within the two section – youth and governance – from each of the three partnerships. Various ongoing projects are being funded by the three mainly discussed partnerships and the mentioned ones are by no means the full included list, however, the aim is to show these projects as examples in a wider debate.

3.1 Youth

According to research conducted by WANA, the Middle East and Africa has “the highest average population growth in the world [...] an unprecedented number of young people“ 41, meanwhile, it is also a region with the highest youth unemployment rates. It is estimated that about 54% of the young are “either unemployed or inactive, with women being particularly affected”.42 These economic difficulties and large unemployment rates make their future uncertain, leading to a demographic marginalization and the perception of the youth not as a demographic but as “a ticking time-bomb”.43 In a declining economy, youth is, therefore, a particularly insecure group of the society, easily exploited and used by radical groups (radicalization) or entering other organized crime activities. Such insecurity and the large-scale problem, therefore, should be one of the first priorities in any security partnership towards the southern Mediterranean. Significantly, if considering approaches towards youth from a human


security standpoint or even furthermore, being seen as a shared responsibility, very little reveals itself. Researching the projects regarding the youth that have been started by the three partnerships evaluated in this paper, reveals very little focus on the human rather than state security. They are indeed seen as “a ticking time bomb” and not only in the region itself.

3.1.1 NATO

With or without addressing the fact that NATO is a military alliance, even if one that has had a political dimension to it all through its existence, particular projects directed towards youth in the Mediterranean Dialogue countries cannot be seen. The primarily bilateral nature first of all implies that the projects are rarely tackling more than mere symptoms of already existing national and human insecurity, but also that they are short-term driven. For example, NATO together with the MD partner, Jordan, through the use of the PfP Fund has begun Jordan III Trust Fund project which aims to build the capacity to increase female representation in the Jordanian Armed Forces. In essence this project addresses youth, as the program targets young recruits as well as the question of gender. 900,000 euro have been dedicated towards it, with plans to further develop the training center infrastructure and the education at the centers in general.\(^4^4\) While such efforts are laudable they represent merely one of, and do not resemble a sound strategy when looking at other programs that in the southern Mediterranean, that primarily treat illegal activity or maritime security.

Amongst all of the practical activities that are accessible to the NATO MD partner states through the Partnership Cooperation Menu, which mostly focuses on military capabilities, very little focus is dedicated to youth as a specific human target group. However, further examination of the projects undertaken, reveals that with the necessary strategic thinking outside of the “hard security” paradigm human-specific focus can be introduced. Particularly this is visible through the commitment to gender issues through, for example, NATO Science for Peace and Security Program which offers funds and assistance for training courses, workshops and study institutes addressing gender-related issues in all levels of conflict prevention.\(^4^5\) Such issue-specific focus within NATO program, therefore, further allows to understand that human security can be built into the practical assistance and through it, the


youth can emerge as an area for necessary improvements. However, as mentioned before, currently lack of sound strategy towards the Southern partners is very clear, especially in the sense of youth as a shared goal.

3.1.2 The European Union

As part of the European Neighborhood Policy also the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue can be seen to address a variety of insecurities in MENA, including youth. They are witness-able in the words and plans of the European Union towards their southern Mediterranean partners. The previously mentioned Global Strategy in its entirety also addresses these same very issues. For example, in a statement on the concept of a “Mediterranean of the future”, along with many other statements, youth are being given a special attention. It is seen as to “in order to strengthen the constructive dialogue between the two shoes of the Mediterranean in all areas, we must focus, empower and invest in women and youth”46 (emphasis added). These statements are in clear correlation with the others expressed by the European Union towards the security of the South since the 1995 Barcelona Process.

The European Union in its practical projects with the Mediterranean countries has been the most generous, indeed many differing projects have been started receiving large sums of funds. Another significant feature is that many of them are started on multilateral basis as such allowing to foster engagement between wider set of states, particular significant given that human insecurity is often transnational. What remains hard to navigate is how all of these projects fit into a coherent strategy of the EU-MED Partnership. Wide selection of projects exists, for example, the Network of Mediterranean Youth. NetMed focuses on three main areas including building up the youth capacities in legislation developments as well as tackling problems with employment. This project, however, while fully funded by the European Union is undertaken by UNESCO. It aims to invest in youth “to build a prosperous future in the Mediterranean”.47 Another similar project is the Young Med Voices Plus, which was launched by the EU External Action Service and the High Representative Mogherini in 2017. The

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initiative was launched to act as a “youth-led “think and do thank”” between Europe and the MENA region. However, this last initiative in its numbers of states involvement does not connect all of the Euro-Med states.

Furthermore, one of the most recent projects reported in the 2017 UfM report is, for example, the organization of forums where the primary participation was the youth from the Mediterranean. Such forums were the Regional Forum in Barcelona themed “Mediterranean in Action: Youth for Stability and Development” followed by a “Bridging Youth Across the Mediterranean” which brought together young people from the region to address issues with education, employability, empowerment, mobility and gender equality.

On a more practical mandate side, the aims to decease youth unemployment have been ongoing. The Mediterranean Initiative for Jobs (Med4Jobs) has begun various projects to address it, for example, by fostering business skill training at universities and schools in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia together with INJAZ Al-Arab. Particularly significant have been job placements, as reported in partnership with INCORpora Spain, for more than 137,000 vulnerable youth in helping them with job searches and training programs in Morocco and Tunisia.

It is significant that the Union of the Mediterranean which is discussed here because of the large funds it receives from the European Union is not a primary point for the aims that address the security challenges of the Mediterranean. Yet, when looking from a human security perspective the projects undertaken by UfM most clearly fall into the category of addressing the security of the people. While not an EU mandated ‘partnership’ it exhibits the strength in a truly shared mandate working together with various political alliances and receiving funding for multiple sources. When considering the importance of human security as a shared responsibility, the UfM could, therefore, serve as a further base upon which to build.

forward the goals that the European Union has indicated towards MENA region (their Mediterranean partners).

3.1.3 OSCE

The OSCE has notably expressed the need to address Youth demographic in the MENA region i.e. in their Mediterranean partner states. Earlier in 2011 at a Civil Society Conference in Vilnius it was voiced that the participating states should further encourage their partners in the Mediterranean to establish a transparent dialogue with youth (and youth representatives in particular) in order to address their needs.\(^5\) The 2016 OSCE Mediterranean Conference also looked at Youth in north and south of the Mediterranean. The Conference, in its conclusions, generally agrees on very academic understanding of insecurity, for example, that in order to prevent radicalization or migration challenges youth needs to be empowered economically, socially and politically.\(^4\) However, youth is then strangely absent from the OSCE strategy document that aims to discuss the addressing of threats to security and stability in the 21st century.\(^5\) Surely, when considering human security as a safety from the seven categories of threats as per the definition (section 1) many of them directly amplify the insecurity experience of youth demographics. Additionally, the problem is also the clear lack of further development tended towards practical applicability and reaching of these goals, above the discourse level alone. While it must be understood that the OSCE primarily acts as a diplomatic tool through which national governments and their partner nations can interact and discuss problems, even in this capacity, youth is not one of the main areas for partner cooperation. When looking at the scope of this partnership, human security as a notion that considers youth cannot be noticeable at all. This remains to be true even with issues such as human trafficking, which is considered one of the main priorities of the OSCE. These co-operation priorities, including this one, are very state and border-centric, as such concentrating on state-security over human security.


\(^4\) OSCE. “Empowerment of youth crucial in preventing violent extremism, conclude participants at OSCE meeting in Vienna.” Last modified June 14, 2016. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/246706>

3.2. Governance

Political legitimacy is important and can be a stabilizing force in underdeveloped states. Meanwhile many of the Mediterranean states have been notorious for high state to nation incongruity i.e. weak perception of the state.\textsuperscript{56} This has been coupled with a high degree of sub and supra state identity penetrations in the societies.\textsuperscript{57} As such the Mediterranean (and the wider MENA region), with few exceptions, is prone to irredentism or secession movements as well as sub-state structure developments. Fragile states are characterized by porous borders, shadow economy, lax policing, collusion and political intimidation due to state authorities’ lack of control mechanisms. While not always, violence tends to also characterize such states as the state authorities lack the means to monopolize the use of force within the state.\textsuperscript{58} State fragility and the deep societal insecurity with internal displacement of populations, migration pressures and porous borders have been evident in the larger cities in the MENA region especially where urbanization has already created additional social strains.\textsuperscript{59}

Therefore, political legitimacy is even more important for further development goals, as development usually takes time to materialize even in stable contexts. Resilient and capable public institutions operating within an environment of rule of law and functioning system of justice are a necessity for international (national) stability. As such it can be argued that human security, which extends to the security from all of the fragile state components, largely depend on these governance institutions and their ability to gain the trust of their constituencies.\textsuperscript{60,61} A withered state is a dangerous one to be in, indicating the utmost importance of the question of governance in looking at southern Mediterranean insecurity and human security in that.

\textsuperscript{57} Hinnebusch, Raymond. \textit{International Politics of the Middle East}. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015.
3.2.1 NATO

The Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO and its strategic aims are visibly very state-focused. The projects that can be remotely tied with governance goals are primarily focusing on corruption in defense sectors. This is simultaneously also one of the main aims of the partnership in general.\textsuperscript{62} Further evaluation of any projects with respect to governance promotion and support, even including merely targeting corruption are hard to be found. This aim is only mentioned in passing (without any clear indicator of what it entails), as the “continuity of government”, for few projects like the training for Iraqi officers in Jordan\textsuperscript{63} or the capacity building in Jordan defense sector.\textsuperscript{64} This exemplifies that very little attention is being dedicated to governance strengthening – be it national or local – rather, any cooperative work with the partners is done through the existing power structures.

3.2.2 European Union

The European Union has long championed their democratic aims to the Middle East and North Africa. Along with the economic goals proposed, the political reforms in the respective partner states have been the bedrock of the policy towards the region. Another of the bedrock principles of the EU, mentioned before, is the principle of “more for more” or positive conditionality which aims to achieve democratic transformation, stronger partnership with the people and sustainable development.\textsuperscript{65} Upcoming for example, is yet another European Parliament-held conference, focusing on democracy, titled: “EU Leadership for Democracy”.\textsuperscript{66} While the technical aims include human and see human security as a concept, the projects themselves are very detached from these larger aims. It is further hard to discuss any shared responsibility, since it is only the Union for the Mediterranean, which is technically not even an EU mechanism, that is perceived with the function to “encourage regional cooperation


among the countries”.\footnote{European Union External Action. “Middle East and North Africa (MENA).” Last modified June 15, 2016. \url{https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/middle-east-north-africa-mena/336/middle-east-and-north-africa-mena_en}} Since the Arab Uprisings very little progress has been made in matters of increasing stable governance i.e. like the rule of law, for example. It could further be argued that the situation has deteriorated instead.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the European Union in their democracy promotion in Mediterranean, have primarily focused on free and fair elections with some added interest to the questions of human rights and basic freedoms.\footnote{Assem Dandashly. “EU democracy promotion and the dominance of the security-stability nexus,” \textit{Mediterranean Politics} 23, no.1 (2018): 64.} This is seen through the work of Civil Society Facility and the European Endowment for Democracy, which has been awarded with EUR 15.4 billion fund for the period 2014-2020.\footnote{Albinyana, Roger. “A Review of EU Policies towards the Mediterranean Region (1957-2016),” \textit{IEMed Focus Article}, no. 136 (October 2016): 6.} The European Endowment of Democracy mentions their mission to be the “supporting people speaking up for democracy”.\footnote{European Endowment for Democracy. “Our Mission.” Accessed August 29, 2018. \url{https://www.democracyendowment.eu/about-eed/}} Upon examining the projects undertaken by the European Endowment for Democracy, however, one cannot but notice the abundance of them dedicated towards the European Eastern partner states – Moldova, Armenia as just few. The funded projects towards the Mediterranean have addressed micro-issues and provided relatively small individual funds to local NGOs and their missions. Among them, is a recent funding to “Association Reseau Mourakiboun” in Tunisia, an organization that “guarantees the holding of democratic […] elections”.\footnote{European Endowment for Democracy. “Association Reseau Mourakiboun.” Accessed August 29, 2018. \url{https://www.democracyendowment.eu/we-support/association-reseau-mourakiboun/}} Also funding to “Nitaq” an organization in Beirut that promoted alternative journalism and free expression\footnote{European Endowment for Democracy. “Nitaq.” Accessed August 29, 2018. \url{https://www.democracyendowment.eu/we-support/nitaq/}} or funding to “Committee for Justice” in Egypt which provides human rights assistance.\footnote{European Endowment for Democracy. “Committee for Justice.” Accessed August 29, 2018. \url{https://www.democracyendowment.eu/we-support/committee-for-justice/}} It can be seen that here ‘civil society’ is perceived as NGOs, with little other governance promotion structures present. These are only few of the organizations that were awarded with funds, and without discounting the important work of each one of them, as well as the necessity for independent funding to the NGOs sector, it is unclear how any democracy promotion or governance sustenance on a larger scale is achieved through these individual projects while continuing the work with the existing regime elites.
Other mentionable examples are, for example, the capacity building and strengthening of central government structures in the border regions under the EU’s Border Assistance Mission (EU BAM). Primarily this project is used in Libya, where it has also been largely unsuccessful. As regarded by Toaldo (2016) it has failed to account for the fact that the post-Gaddafi government lacked the capacity to absorb them in the first place. Its approach primarily targets state security, with the aim to address the spill-over effects to the European security, yet it did not account for the political dynamics of pre-Gaddafi-ousting Libya with its rentier state structures. This, therefore, presents yet another example in seeing how the ready-made security initiatives provided to the region are often faulty and lacking long-term strategic vision.

3.2.3 OSCE

The OSCE in their “Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century” document acknowledges that strong democratic institutions and rule of law are important in addressing threats (to the state). It is particularly state weakness (weak governance) that opens up wider opportunities for instability to grow and breed. It further addresses the importance of socioeconomic and environmental factors, as well as considers the fact that threats are often transnational in their character, therefore, require a multinational effort in addressing them.

Practically this goal has been instructed upon one of the two mechanisms that the OSCE has, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which has aimed at working in this area – as “the main institution for the human dimension”. It has provided election monitoring and supervision assistance, which has been enhanced following 2011 events. Additional activities include legislation support and review, as in the case of Tunisia, under the program “Increasing Understanding in the Human Dimension”. The cooperation occurs on a governmental level by providing both a platform for dialogue exchange and assistance in election observation, political participation and gender equality. However, furthermore, the

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OSCE has also been involved with actors on a non-state level, organizing workshops to citizen election monitories in Tunisia\(^\text{79}\), Egypt and Morocco\(^\text{80}\), but not limited to that. Through the ODIHR, knowledge is shared in other fields such as legislative assistance and human rights training.\(^\text{81}\) In regard to what was perceived as transformations following the Arab Uprisings, the OSCE continues to state their readiness in supporting democratic transitions in the region.\(^\text{82}\) In their work they also seem to understand the significance of the local dimension and ownership – involving local actors in the dialogue and building upon sub-regional progress. This is the aim of the Track II – the stimulation and support to the diplomatic dialogue. However, the ODIHR as the prime practical mechanism, has focused much less on promoting rule of law or good governance in a wider-scale, as much as free and fair election processes, therefore, only touching upon a small aspect of the human insecurity in the region.

### 4. Human Security vs National Security

Originally the concept of security has been firmly tied with that of state sovereignty and as such, national security. The idea of what constitutes this security has, however, varied according to the historical moment “depending on the circumstances of war and political tensions among members of the international community”.\(^\text{83}\) The insecurity discourse has placed issues like migration and terrorism at the forefront of all partnership efforts, including notably in the three discussed security partnerships. As much of the academic literature regards, none of these challenges can be seen individually and are often tied to a range of other issues, for example, the seven categories of threats as proposed in the UNDP Human Security report. Significantly, both terrorism and irregular migration at the heart of it hold the “human”, yet, the idea of human security has been widely ignored in the practical security world. Issues such as border control, at the center of Mediterranean approaches from all three of the partnerships discussed here, are issues of national security for Europe. These issues can be traced to the


challenges of youth and governance, yet these same aspects are largely absent from any practical projects. Problems such as border insecurity when approached from a national security angle are often one-dimensional and as such are addressed by issue-specific projects. Being approached as a short-term challenge, these projects ignore the systematic issues that lead to the creation of the specific security threat in the first place. When looking at the areas of youth and governance in particular, an additional example are the large funds being spent on individual projects for democracy promotion. Not only it exemplifies the doubling of similar efforts from organizations like the European Union and OSCE, but also the lack of larger image creation that would approach governance as anything beyond mere election processes. This indicates a lack of coherent strategy on a global and regional level that can also be attributable to the lack of responsibility sharing. Indeed, since the Arab Uprisings the insecurity in the region has only worsened, despite the continuous funding and single problem-tackling projects from the security partnerships. This worsening, therefore, indicates that the current approaches undertaken by the security partnerships discussed here are largely failing.

Human security is affected by shifting geopolitical landscapes, as such allowing to follow the changing security situations on ground. The security approaches adopted by the partnerships have not been as flexible. The EU’s security paradigm towards the Mediterranean has been expressed through an idea that security is maximized by preserving stability of the state.\(^4\) This paradigm has been unchanging since the creation of the European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership more than 20 years ago. As such, this frame, which focuses on national security, has continuously guided the policies of the organization towards their partner states. This is consistent with the way that security seems to be approached in the two other security partnerships – NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation. These developments are additionally complicated by the noticeable organizational structure which mirrors the existent core-periphery relationship. The “security-giver” mentality exists as rather than working as a true partnership the funded projects function as ready-made security solutions to the partner nations, passed down in a top-down approach. This not only excludes the human aspect, if it is not already built into the project from the security-provider (organization) side, but also leaves very little space for shared responsibility of the outcomes. If something is accepted as a ready-made solution then the lack of its successful

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\(^4\) Roccu, Roberto and Voltolini, Benedetta. “Framing and reframing the EU’s engagement with the Mediterranean: Examining the security-stability nexus before and after the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 23, no. 1: 1-22.
implementation or failure can be attributed to the receiver of these solutions, in this case the Mediterranean partner states. This can be seen in the case of Libya, as examined in chapter 3, focusing on border control. However, this conclusion is consistent with the examination of all three of the partnerships and their projects. Not only such partnership-approach challenges the development of North-South relationship, but they also hinder the possibility of guiding stronger South-South relationship development in the region. Furthermore, there is very little practical interaction amongst the “security-providers”, such as the three organizations examined here, despite them often having an overlapping set of member and partner states.

The discourse, as per the speeches of the senior executives, together with the publications of the partnerships show that there is an understanding of a deeper future for security and conflict management that rests on burden sharing between global, regional and national actors. The question is then, how to push these partnerships in becoming flexible and easily adaptable to the very changing security environments in which they operate. This would include a further focus on human security as an overarching theme as well as responsibility sharing as a function. It is, for example, clear that the OSCE has a mandate that permits a multidimensional approach, one that without directly naming it, has already considered human security, in their dialogues. However, it lacks both funding and will in tackling the problems on a larger scale, signifying the need for an approach that focuses on sharing – shared responsibility. International organization such as NATO or the OSCE, and the EU (perhaps not under the perception of an “organization”) are well positioned to address these challenges, however, what is needed is their joint strategic plans of genuine commitment to sharing this responsibility. Significantly connecting with the earlier discussion of human security as a practical approach in security strengthening, this document acknowledges that security foremost is a responsibility of the state in the face of their own citizens. While the human security concept and wider academic debate often calls for the complete removal of the state and mere focus on the individual and communities, the view expressed in this paper, argues that for a practical applicability, the state should not be completely excluded, instead it should be built upon without forgetting the human.

5. Conclusion

This paper has been prepared in preparation for the Larnaca workshop on shared responsibility in the MENA region. It has aimed to provide a review of the existing security partnerships operating in the very complex security environment in the southern Mediterranean states. The three partnerships examined here are NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and OSCE’s Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. Although they are not the only existing security partnerships, the chosen ones exemplify a wide range of security frameworks from a military alliance to a primarily dialogue-based mandate. In the review particular attention was given to the notion of human security and its role in responsibility sharing as a way to mitigate the primarily national security focus that has been prevalent in the security discourse and partnerships. Human security as a concept and practice in an insecure region encompasses wide range of issues that often transcend borders. Additionally, in this paper, further attention is dedicated to areas such as youth and governance due to these being the main themes of the Larnaca workshop.

The paper has found that while the discourse often recognizes the importance of youth in their security goals, the practical projects themselves rarely show any effort in addressing the challenges with large number of young people with the potential of further state marginalization. This conclusion is further consistent in the examination of engagement with governance, which for the biggest part is primarily focused on elections and election monitoring. Governance functions or engagement, meanwhile, is also perceived primarily as through the prism of civil society, which is almost exclusively observed as NGOs. The overall analysis of the research conducted further reveals that while the aims of the individual projects and discussions speak of human security either directly or indirectly, the projects themselves seem to lack any strategic oversight to perceive security as anything above the lack of violence or direct threats to state sovereignty. While the projects aim to address prevention of security threats in the immediate terms, they rarely foresee how these same projects could prevent threats from erupting (or returning) in the future. It can, therefore, be concluded that working to develop an environment where people could live in “the freedom from fear and freedom from want” is largely absent.

Policy Recommendations:

- The security models, or “frames” through which the region is understood, have been used for at least a decade in each of these partnerships. They significantly concentrate
on the perception that equates the lack of violence with security, therefore, advocating for a short-term stability at all costs. These perceptions are are visibly not working. Therefore “the reframing of frames” where the “human” would be placed at the heart of the security approaches promoted, is necessary. This would elevate the human security conditions and improve the human and state insecurity in the southern Mediterranean.

- All three of the security mechanisms discussed and analyzed in this paper are sufficiently capable of addressing the challenging security environment, however, as the years of practice have shown with very little improvements on the ground – it is not possible alone. Mechanisms need to be further developed that would allow the strengthening of cooperation and sharing not only between the organizations themselves, but also organizations and their partners as well as partners to partners. Engaging in a substantial level with the concept of shared responsibility therefore requires a change (or rather improvements) on three dimensions.
  
  o Furthermore, all three of the security partnerships and their mechanisms should dedicate increased efforts in broadening the engagement with actors on the ground. This would require additional effort, that moves away from the tradition of engaging with civil actors alone (usually NGO groups). Understanding the environment in which the partnership truly operates includes engaging with actors such as local governments (as opposed to a handful of diplomats), religious leaders, doctors and teachers and community leaders. This is of particular significance given the impact of tribal roots in many of the southern Mediterranean states.

- The security solutions and practical projects at the level viewed in this paper exhibit a security provider mentality which falls into the wider debate of core-periphery relationships between states. The discourse indicates that the partnerships see themselves as the providers of ready-made solutions, even in the cases where a strong grounding of the partnership comes from its dialogue function (for example OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation).

- An appraisable and potentially fruitful strategic decision from NATO has been the opening of the Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples which intends to work as “an information gathering organization” and a centralized forum for engagement with the southern partners, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue ones. This Hub could act as a
place to develop a coherent strategy in addressing the insecurity and would strongly benefit from establishing a framework based on trust with the partners on the ground. The research circulated through the Hub already indicates that it is a place that has the potential of engaging with human security on a deeper level.

6. Questions

1. The partnerships discussed in this paper are often stringently restricted by their official mandates or political climate in which they operate. How to push the partnerships in becoming flexible and adaptable to the very changing security environments in which they operate (just as threats are themselves)?

2. What is the role that security practitioners and academics can play in advancing this goal?

3. Human Security as a notion has often received a lot of criticism for its very wide definition and the lack of clear start-end point. Would a further engagement with the concept itself be necessary to find a definition that can be proposed to foster engagement of the security partnerships?

4. Human Security as a notion is repeatedly sidelined under the state of exception (the idea that traditional security comes first). The understanding in the policy circles still mainly misses that money spent on traditional security short-term do not fix the long-term problems. How to bridge these short-term security goals with the longer-term stability?

5. We can perceive the lack of shared responsibility on two axes:

   a. First on the partnership to partner state level where the security solutions are often exactly that – readymade suggestions from the Partnerships.

   b. Partner to partner level in this case the Middle East and North African states that are partners to the three partnerships discussed.

   Would you agree and if so, can this challenge be mitigated without engaging in a much deeper core-periphery relationship debate?